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Answering to future people: Responsibility for climate change in a breaking world. 
 
Our everyday notions of responsibility are often driven by our need to justify 
ourselves to specific others – especially those we harm, wrong, or otherwise affect. 
One challenge for contemporary ethics is to extend this interpersonal urgency to our 
relations with those future people who are harmed or affected by our actions. In this 
paper, I explore our responsibility for climate change by imagining a possible ‘broken 
future’, damaged by the carbon emissions of previous generations (including 
ourselves), and then asking what its inhabitants might think of our current behaviour, 
our moral thinking, and our excuses. In particular, I will focus on a simplified 
scenario where present people can only avoid a broken future by sacrificing Rawlsian 
favourable conditions. Suppose we refuse to avoid a broken future, on the grounds 
that we cannot be expected to make such great sacrifices. If the broken future lacks 
favourable conditions, will its inhabitants accept our excuses? Will they hold us 
responsible for things we regard as excusable? If so, should we be guided by their 
judgements or by our own? 
 
1. The need for future justification. 
 
To respond adequately to climate change, and other threats to future generations, we 
urgently need a new ethic to balance responsibilities to future people against 
obligations to our contemporaries. The philosophical literature on climate change 
develops this new ethic and explores these new responsibilities.1 But obligations to 
distant future people lack the felt moral urgency of obligations to contemporaries, and 
thus lose out (both in practice and in moral theory) when the two conflict. This paper 
asks how we might correct this imbalance. I imagine a broken future damaged by 
anthropogenic climate change, and ask how its more philosophical inhabitants might 
respond to our attempts to justify ourselves to them. 
 
One challenge in intergenerational ethics is to develop a moderate theory that 
recognises obligations to future people without imposing extreme demands.2 Any 
moderate intergenerational ethic faces two challenges: motivational and theoretical. 
We must motivate present people to take their obligations to future people more 
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seriously than most of us do; and we need to know how those obligations should be 
balanced against our duties to one another.  
 
This paper introduces an explicitly second-personal intergenerational ethic, drawing 
on Stephen Darwall’s recent work on the ethical significance of the second-person 
standpoint.3 Our moral decisions must be justified, not merely against some impartial 
standard, but also to the particular individuals who are affected. If I sacrifice your life 
(whether for the common good or to save myself), then I must provide some moral 
justification that is addressed to you.  
 
The second-person perspective does seem relevant between contemporaries. If it 
disappears when we turn to future people, then their interests will inevitably lose out. 
One possibility, of course, is that second-personal justification is limited to 
contemporaries – and this is why intergenerational ethics is less important! But we 
should only accept this (comforting and self-serving) asymmetry after we have 
explored all the resources of future-oriented second-personalism and found them 
wanting. 
 
If it succeeds, future-oriented second-personalism promises both motivational and 
theoretical benefits. One widespread actual motivation is a desire to justify oneself to 
particular individuals. Asking how actual future people might respond can thus give 
our intergenerational obligations the same kind of felt urgency as our obligations to 
contemporaries. And one sign that we have balanced intra- and inter-generational 
obligations appropriately is that we can justify ourselves equally well to both present 
and future people. 
 
The idea of justifying ourselves to future people is common in everyday language. 
(Even in our everyday lives, we sometimes pause to ask what our more distant 
descendants will think of us.) But it is largely absent in the philosophical literature. 
One possible explanation is that justifications to distant future people face several 
obvious metaphysical and epistemological barriers which lead philosophers to regard 
such justifications as impossible. My first task is to remove those barriers. 
 
2. Barriers to future justification. 
 3 
 
Our first barrier is Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem.4 Most decisions affecting the 
distant future are Different People Choices, where alternative actions bring different 
sets of possible people into existence. But how can I justify myself to someone who 
would never have existed at all if I had done otherwise? Demands for justification in 
non-identity cases seem either incoherent (we cannot compare existence with non-
existence) or trivial (no one can complain if her life is worth living and she would not 
otherwise have existed).  
 
Parfit’s non-identity problem has generated a vast literature.5 Person-affecting 
theorists reply that future people can complain even when their lives are worth living 
and they would not otherwise have existed at all. For instance, in his intergenerational 
extension of Scanlon’s contractualism, Rahul Kumar argues that a potential mother 
may display a morally objectionable attitude to ‘her future child’ even when different 
behaviour would have produced a (numerically) different child.6 Once he exists, her 
actual child can complain on behalf of the broader set of possible future children his 
mother might have had. Similarly, if our collective behaviour manifests an 
objectionable attitude towards future people, then, even if their lives are worth living 
and they (as individuals) would not otherwise have existed, all future people can 
complain that we have failed to treat them with the respect due to them as persons. 
 
Person-affecting responses to non-identity remain controversial.7 A full defence of 
Kumar, or any other person-affecting theorist, would take us too far afield. However, 
person-affecting principles have considerable intuitive appeal. And anyone 
sympathetic to either second-personalism or the search for a moderate 
intergenerational ethic is especially likely to accept some person-affecting moral 
principles.8 Finally, as we shall soon see, second-personalism can itself support 
person-affecting principles, because any demonstration that future people would 
accept a principle obviously enhances its appeal. 
 
I conclude, therefore, that if we are to give second-personalism a sympathetic hearing, 
we can reasonably assume that non-identity alone does not rule it out, and that our 
future-oriented second-personal justifications can cite independently credible person-
affecting moral principles. 
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Our second barrier is pervasive uncertainty about the future. We choose, not between 
definite possible futures inhabited by definite individuals, but rather among actions 
whose consequences are largely unknown. We cannot justify ourselves to future 
people, because we have no clear idea what we need to justify or to whom. Non-
identity is only one dimension of this uncertainty. Many factors can affect the fate of 
distant future people without threatening their identity or existence. Solving the non-
identity problem would not automatically remove our second barrier. 
 
Uncertainty does complicate our obligations to future people. But uncertainty alone 
cannot excuse gambling with the lives of others. We must still justify our decision to 
impose the risk of harm on future people. And we should offer that justification to 
future people. 
 
Of course, risks of harm are often easier to justify than definite harms. (If risks of very 
unlikely harm were never justified, modern life would be all but impossible.) But the 
crucial point is that, even where it is permissible, every imposition of risk must still be 
justified. And this justification is more problematic if (a) the harm you suffer is much 
greater than the benefit I obtain, or (b) you do not benefit from the risk I impose, or 
(c) I am much better-off than you, or (d) my actions show a reckless disregard for 
your interests.9 When all these conditions are met – as they are in the cases discussed 
below – my justification must be very strong indeed.10 
 
Uncertainty is one possible justification for discounting the future, but it cannot 
suffice on its own. Unless we are sometimes justified in imposing definite harms, we 
cannot justify risks of significant harm either. I therefore set uncertainty aside in this 
paper, and focus on other reasons to discount future harm.  
 
This may seem too swift. Any specific possible future is vanishingly unlikely to arise. 
The more detail we add to our imaginary future, the more unlikely it becomes. Why 
should we justify ourselves to possible people who will almost certainly never exist, 
for things that will almost certainly never happen?11 
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My reply draws on Kumar’s Scanlonian response to non-identity. Imaginary debates 
with morally eccentric individuals in peculiar futures would demonstrate nothing. But 
my imaginary dialogue with a future philosopher is not idiosyncratic. It cites only 
generic features of her world: features that are shared across a wide range of 
(otherwise very disparate) possible futures. We do not know exactly what harms 
climate change will cause. But we do know it may very well cause significant and 
lasting harm. And climate change is not the only route to a broken world. (Other 
routes include technological catastrophe, financial collapse, etc.)12 My specific future 
philosopher represents, and complains on behalf of, the much broader class of ‘future 
people whose world is broken by us’. Indeed, the risk of a broken future is imposed 
on all possible future people – and not only on those living in broken futures. So any 
future person can complain about our reckless attitude to her. 
 
A third barrier is that, unlike Kumar’s hypothetical contractualism, second-personal 
justification requires actual dialogue. This requirement increases our uncertainty. 
(How can we know what future people will accept?) It also seems morally dubious. 
When they come apart from what is reasonable, why should actual responses matter 
at all? Surely our actions are not indefensible simply because some unpredictable 
quirk of future moral evolution leads future people to wilfully reject our cogent 
defence? Conversely, clearly reprehensible behaviour would not be justified simply 
because future people with adaptive preferences failed to object to it. 
 
Second-personal justification only matters when the other person is reasonable. But it 
doesn’t follow that actual acceptance is redundant. Actual complaints, acceptances, 
and replies often help us discover what is reasonable. (I might not realize my action is 
objectionable until someone actually objects!) But the value of actual responses is not 
merely epistemic. It also has significant motivational force. We want to act on moral 
principles that actual reasonable people do accept, not merely on principles that could 
have been reasonably accepted.  
 
For second-personalism to work, the moral perspectives of actor and patient must be 
mutually intelligible.13 I must understand your complaint and you must understand my 
defence. I therefore assume a sympathetic future audience who share our basic moral 
framework. This simplification has three pragmatic rationales. First, we want to 
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respond to distant future people’s reasonable complaints, and we can only start from 
our own notion of reasonableness. Second, if one specific future can represent a 
broader class, then why not select representative future philosophers who are best-
suited to interpret our moral defence? Other possible people with different moral 
outlooks will presumably share similar complaints. Finally, precisely because it 
makes our task easier, my assumption of a sympathetic audience will render any 
negative result even more disturbing. If we cannot justify ourselves even to distant 
future people who share our values, then that is worrying news indeed.  
 
Despite our three apparent barriers, future-oriented second-personalism is not absurd. 
The rest of this paper argues that it is fruitful. 
 
3. The Choice and the Broken World. 
 
Justification is always offered to someone for something. The ‘someone’ is: future 
people. But what are we answering to those future people for? To focus our 
discussion, I present an over-simplified example. 
 
The Choice: We face a binary choice between two options: Business-as-usual and 
Conservation. These two policies offer the following payoffs to present and future 
people: 
 
1.   Present people fare better in Business-as-usual than in Conservation. 
2. Future people fare better in Conservation than in Business-as-usual. 
3. In Conservation, present people fare better than future people. 
 
The four possible payoffs are thus ordered: Pb > Pc > Fc > Fb. 
 
Conditions 1 and 2 jointly ensure an intergenerational conflict of interest: what is best 
for present people is not best for future people. Condition 3 ensures that, whatever we 
choose, we fare better than future people. Business-as-usual imposes an outcome that 
is worse for future people than what we avoid for themselves 
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The Choice is very schematic. Much depends on how exactly the cost to present 
people under Conservation compares to the cost to future people under Business-as-
usual. Is the gap between Pb and Pc greater than the gap between Fc and Fb? 
 
I flesh-out the Choice using a broken world where resources are insufficient to meet 
everyone's basic needs, a chaotic climate makes life precarious, each generation is 
worse-off than the last, and our affluent way of life is no longer an option. 
Philosophers in that broken world look back in disbelief at a lost age of affluence. 
They struggle to make sense of the opulent worldview of late-affluent philosophers 
such as Nozick and Rawls, and the behaviour of affluent citizens like us.14 
 
The broken world lacks several ubiquitous but often unacknowledged presuppositions 
of recent moral and political thought. We naturally assume that future people will be 
better-off than present people; and that the interests of different generations largely 
coincide. In a broken world, by definition, future people are worse-off than present 
people, well-being continues to decline, and inter-generational conflicts of interest 
abound. 
 
Another difference is that the broken world lacks Rawlsian favourable conditions.15 A 
society enjoys favourable conditions if its members possess sufficient sophistication 
and prosperity to establish liberal democratic institutions that meet all basic needs 
without sacrificing any basic liberties. Rawls argues that virtually all modern societies 
enjoy favourable conditions.16 But no broken society can meet all basic needs, and 
therefore none could possibly establish Rawlsian liberal institutions that both meet 
basic needs and protect basic liberties. 
 
In a broken world, this future scarcity is an ongoing fact of life, not a one-off 
catastrophe.17 Scarcity of material resources (especially water) and unpredictable 
climate mean that societies periodically face population bottlenecks where not 
everyone can survive. However, this is not a completely catastrophic world. I imagine 
modern large-scale industrialised societies, not scattered groupings of post-
apocalyptic hunter/gatherer tribes. Apart from its broken-ness, this future world is as 
close as possible to our own. 
 
 8 
The broken world is one credible future. No-one can reasonably be confident that it 
won’t happen. It involves no outlandish claims, scientific impossibilities, or 
implausible expectations about human behaviour. Climate change – or some other 
disaster – might produce a broken future. Of course, many other futures are also 
credible. Some are much better, others much worse. Our epistemic situation does not 
allow confident predictions either way. But the broken world is one very real 
possibility. And, as I argued in section 2, its inhabitants represent the broader class of 
possible future people who are worse-off than us because of our decisions. 
 
In this paper, I take the credibility of my broken future as given, and explore its 
impact on our responsibilities regarding climate change. Suppose Business-as-usual 
fails to prevent or mitigate climate change. Can we justify that choice to those who 
inherit a broken world? To generate a stark version of the Choice, I stipulate that our 
society enjoys favourable conditions, but that Conservation would threaten those 
conditions for present people. Whatever we do from now on, future people will 
inhabit a broken world without favourable conditions. Conservation would lessen 
their burdens in that world, but it also requires us to leave some present basic needs 
unmet.18 
 
Most current climate-change-inducing behaviour does not protect favourable 
conditions. The Choice is deliberately unrealistic. It shows Business-as-usual in its 
most favourable light, where present people protect background conditions for justice 
itself, rather than insisting on dispensable luxuries such as higher living standards, 
more convenient travel, or fancier consumer goods. This may not reflect our present 
situation. But it is one future possibility. If the future is broken, then some generation 
will face this dramatic choice.19 
 
I have presented the Choice as a collective decision by present people that impacts 
(collectively) on future people. I then ask how we can justify ourselves to them. 
Second-personal justification can be plural. But it can also be singular. We might 
instead ask how I could justify myself to some specific future person living in a 
broken world. I then have two options. First, I can defend our collective choice of 
Business-as-usual. Second, I can defend my response to our (unjustified) choice. I 
might argue that I have done what I could to prevent that choice; or that no-one could 
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reasonably expect me to do more; or that I have distanced myself sufficiently from 
Business-as-usual (perhaps by non-participation, political campaigning, or 
environmental activism). I argue below that future philosophers will be more 
interested in our collective justifications. But individual justification is also worth 
exploring. 
 
4. Ethics within the broken future. 
 
Before justifying ourselves to future people in a broken world, we must first explore 
their ethical thinking. Contemporary ethics presupposes that future people will be 
better-off than present people; that the interests of different generations largely 
coincide; and that favourable conditions will persist indefinitely. The removal of these 
three presuppositions has a significant impact on moral philosophy within the broken 
world.20 One very striking difference is the need for a survival lottery. 
 
Any complex society requires political institutions. Because they lack favourable 
conditions and face periodic population bottle-necks, broken world societies need some 
way to determine who lives and who dies. I call such procedures ‘survival lotteries’. A 
central task of broken world philosophy is to design a just survival lottery. Theories of 
freedom, rights, responsibilities, human flourishing, authority, and much else, must all 
earn their keep within some over-arching vision of a just society governed by a fair 
lottery. Future philosophers may draw on affluent debates about the role of lotteries in 
allocating our scarce resources – such as medical technologies, political offices, 
university places, or other limited opportunities.21 
 
‘Survival lottery’ is a term of art. A survival lottery does not necessarily involve any 
actual lottery. Indeed, it might reject direct redistribution altogether. A libertarian 
society facing a chaotic climate could simply let the chips fall where they may. I 
classify this as a libertarian survival lottery, because it represents a collective 
decision to allow the natural distribution of survival-chances to remain uncorrected. 
By contrast, anyone wanting to extend liberal, egalitarian, or contractualist theories 
into a broken world will instead seek a fair redistribution of the burdens imposed by 
scarce resources and chaotic climate. Broken world Rawlsians, for instance, seek 
institutions that fairly distribute the benefits and burdens of both natural lottery and 
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social cooperation. These Rawlsian survival lotteries may well incorporate literal 
lotteries. 
 
The removal of Rawlsian favourable conditions, and the accompanying introduction 
of societies built around survival lotteries, is the most counter-intuitive element of my 
broken future. The idea of people reconciling themselves to such brutal bureaucratic 
procedures may seem far-fetched. Survival lotteries strike us as morally unthinkable. 
What useful moral lessons can we learn by pretending to imagine the unthinkable? 
 
I believe, on the contrary, that their unthinkableness is the very reason why we must 
imagine survival lotteries now. Broken futures are credible. Our existing liberal 
democratic institutions can only survive into such futures by transforming themselves 
into just survival lotteries. If we refuse to even admit the possibility of such 
transformation, then we leave our descendants without the moral tools to navigate the 
grim reality we bequeath them. If we leave future people in a place where they must 
think the unthinkable, then we must think it too. Perhaps the design of a just survival 
lottery should also be our central philosophical concern.  
 
Other distinctive features of broken world ethics will emerge as we proceed. These 
are mostly corollaries of scarcity, the loss of favourable conditions, and the need for 
survival lotteries. 
 
5. Impersonal defences. 
 
Suppose we opt for Business-as-usual over Conservation. How might we defend 
ourselves? One option is an impersonal defence: Business-as-usual promotes 
aggregate value better than Conservation. We do not favour ourselves. We simply do 
what any impartial third party would recommend. (A less ambitious impersonal 
defence would argue that, despite its actually bad consequences, Business-as-usual 
maximised ex ante expected value.) 
 
Impersonal defences might work for some analogues of the Choice. However, I set 
them aside in this paper, for two reasons. First, even if Business-as-usual does 
maximise impersonal value, this fact alone does not guarantee an adequate second-
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personal defence. Future people may still ask why they should pay such a heavy price 
for maximum impersonal value. Indeed, second-personalism appeals precisely 
because, unlike impersonal theories such as utilitarianism, it respects what Rawls 
dubbed the ‘separateness of persons’.22 Second, if we are only allowed to favour 
ourselves when our interests coincide with maximum (actual or expected) value, then 
intergenerational ethics will be extremely demanding, because the well-being of 
future people will swamp the projects of present people.23. As we are exploring the 
prospects of moderate intergenerational ethics, we can conclude that impersonal 
defences will not suffice. 
 
I stipulate, then, that if we sought to maximise impersonal value in the Choice, we 
would choose Conservation.24 Our question is whether we can justify ourselves to 
future people when we favour ourselves in ways that do not maximise actual or 
expected value. Can we justify Business-as-usual when it does not track impersonal 
value? 
 
To further explore the limitations of impersonal defences, we now consider one 
Rawlsian variant. Suppose we agree that Business-as-usual does not maximise 
impersonal value according to any standard utilitarian ranking. Could it still preserve 
something essential that would otherwise be lost? Could what is at stake for present 
people in the Choice be objectively more significant than what is at stake for future 
people? 
 
This brings us to our first defence. It is inspired by two Rawlsian claims: that justice 
is the pre-eminent social virtue, and that justice as we know it presupposes favourable 
conditions. The emergence of favourable conditions was the moral turning-point in 
human history. Analogously, the most salient possible future event is the loss of 
favourable conditions. In the Choice, we must delay this irreparable loss as long as 
possible. Once favourable conditions are gone, further losses are comparatively 
insignificant. 
 
This defence of Business-as-usual is impersonal. We are not favouring ourselves. We 
are merely doing what is impartially best. Can we offer this justification to distant 
future people? A successful second-personal justification requires future people in the 
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broken world to acknowledge the importance of favourable conditions. I shall argue 
instead that future philosophers will turn this particular affluent defence on its head. 
 
Imagine a future philosopher, living in a broken world, who is presented with this 
impersonal defence, and wonders whether it could justify our choice of Business-as-
usual. How might she reply? Here is one possibility.25 
 
‘This alleged “essential” is just another self-indulgent affluent luxury. We now 
know that human civilisation does not need favourable conditions. Of course, 
such conditions would be nice. We can only regret that we ourselves will never 
enjoy them. But society can survive without them. And, more importantly, 
justice is still possible. In our broken world, where harsh choices between basic 
needs and basic liberties are an ongoing fact of life, our interest in justice is 
actually stronger than anything the apathetic citizens of late-affluent liberal 
democracy could muster. We care deeply whether our survival lotteries are just, 
and we strive to live humanely and fairly in their shadow. When affluent 
philosophers asserted that justice without favourable conditions was 
unthinkable, they merely demonstrated their inability to see beyond their own 
limited conceptual horizons. 
 
‘Indeed, while their ‘essential condition’ was dispensable, something even more 
basic is essential. And this is the very thing we are now in danger of losing thanks 
to the affluents’ choice. Justice does not require favourable conditions. There can 
be just survival lotteries. But survival lotteries themselves, whether just or 
unjust, are possible only in what we, mirroring Rawls, now call “bearable 
conditions”. A society enjoys bearable conditions if and only if it is able to 
institute a stable survival lottery that offers each citizen a chance of survival and 
a quality of life (if one does survive) that are together sufficient to motivate a 
normal human being to accept and endorse that lottery, and to comply with its 
verdicts. (Favourable conditions are a special case, where lotteries are replaced 
by guarantees.) Bearable conditions require both adequate physical resources 
(food, fuel, a not-too-unstable climate) and adequate social resources 
(community solidarity, technical competence, and so on). 
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‘Without bearable conditions, no stable survival lottery can take hold, and 
society inevitably collapses into tyranny, civil war, and chaos. We all know by 
observation that our society currently enjoys bearable conditions. Our own 
survival lottery is relatively just, and the real barrier to greater justice is political 
will. (Our situation thus mirrors Rawls’s own diagnosis of the barriers to justice 
in the affluent age.) But we are also all familiar with other societies – in the 
recent past or in other lands – where conditions became unbearable and 
civilization collapsed. 
 
‘No-one knows precisely where the threshold lies when conditions become 
unbearable. But our own societies are coming perilously close to that tipping 
point. As our climate becomes more chaotic and crop yields wither, disaffection 
with even the best survival lotteries is growing. Some fellow citizens have even 
lost hope in the very idea of a just survival lottery! If our affluent ancestors had 
chosen Conservation instead of Business-as-usual, our enjoyment of bearable 
conditions would be much more secure.  
 
‘Bearable conditions are objectively more significant than favourable ones. 
Human civilisation existed without favourable conditions for many millennia 
before the affluent age. But the loss of bearable conditions is fatal, not only to 
justice, but to everything else worth defending. The collapse of all human 
civilisation is a difference in kind, while the gap between Rawlsian justice and 
our just survival lotteries is a mere difference in degree. (It is worse to lose the 
concept of justice altogether than to merely replace one conception with another.)  
 
‘An objective justification would imply, not only that the affluents were justified 
in choosing Business-as-usual, but also that we should endorse that choice. 
Suppose we invented time travel, and we could jump back and impose 
Conservation. Should we refrain, to preserve favourable conditions a little 
longer? Of course not! This shows that Business-as-usual is not objectively 
better. (This example is unrealistic, of course. If we really could leap through 
time, we would go further back and eliminate climate change altogether!)’ 
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This broken world reply makes many controversial assumptions, not least that 
bearable conditions are at stake in the Choice. But it does illustrate the fragility of any 
impersonal defence.26 
 
If we cannot collectively justify ourselves, can I objectively defend my individual 
behaviour? Can I claim that, if I had distanced myself further from Business-as-usual, 
then I would have suffered a greater loss than any future individual? This seems very 
unlikely. As well as risking the collapse of human civilization, Business-as-usual 
significantly increases each future person’s likelihood of an early death. If my entire 
defence is impersonal, then I must oppose Business-as-usual until my life is seriously 
threatened. I could perhaps refuse to reduce my carbon footprint below subsistence, or 
reject eco-terrorism in a jurisdiction that retains the death penalty. But I must make 
every other feasible sacrifice. To justify less demanding individual responses to 
climate change, we must look elsewhere. 
 
6. Agent-centred prerogatives. 
 
If no impersonal defence is available, how else might we justify Business-as-usual? 
We seek a moral principle that both justifies Business-as-usual and can itself be 
justified to future people. The rest of this paper explores our options. The next section 
considers exceptions based on emergencies, duties to less fortunate contemporaries, 
and rights to subsistence. In the present section, I explore moderate agent-centred 
prerogatives. 
 
My catalogue of possible defences is not exhaustive. But I believe it does fairly 
represent our principal options. Once we admit that impersonal reasons favour 
Conservation, any defence of Business-as-usual requires either a permission to favour 
ourselves or an obligation that is owed to contemporaries but not to future people. The 
former can be either a general right to do as we please, or a specific right to protect 
some vital interest. And the latter must be based on some legitimate present 
expectation that future people cannot share. While other defences are imaginable, they 
are likely to resemble those outlined below. 
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My first non-impersonal defence is drawn from contemporary consequentialist 
debates about beneficence. What do wealthy individuals owe to people starving in 
distant lands? Consequentialists offer two broad answers. Moderates defend agent-
centred prerogatives allowing agents to give disproportionate weight in their practical 
deliberations to their own interests, values, or perspectives.27 Extremists insist that 
everyone should always adopt the impersonal perspective.28 Extremists reject 
Business-as-usual and defend very stringent obligations to avoid climate change.29 As 
we seek to defend Business-as-usual, we can reasonably presuppose moderation and 
ask whether agent-centred prerogatives could justify Business-as-usual. 
 
Agent-centred prerogatives belong to debates about beneficence. They come into play 
only when agents are not responsible for the plight of others, would not be violating 
any moral rules, and would be using their own legitimate resources. Giving to charity 
is beneficent. But paying tax, repaying debts, returning stolen property, and refraining 
from murder are not. Moderate moral theory recognises a distinction between doing 
and allowing, and also regards our duty to assist strangers as weaker than our duty not 
to harm them.30 
 
Agent-centred prerogatives thus apply only when two necessary conditions are met: 
innocence and ownership.31 Imagine a very simple case. Rich wants to put her own 
interests ahead of Poor’s. The innocence condition stipulates that Rich is not herself 
responsible for Poor’s plight, and Rich’s favouring herself violates no deontological 
rule. This condition looks both backward and forward. Rich can refrain from helping 
a stranger, but she cannot kill a healthy relative to inherit his wealth, or fail to avert a 
threat that she herself has created. 
 
The ownership condition stipulates that the resources Rich keeps for herself already 
belong to her. Rich is deliberating about the disposal of her own individual private 
property, not the distribution of manna from heaven. Rich can refuse to share her food 
because she wants to throw a lavish banquet, but she cannot steal Poor’s food to do 
the same. 
 
Any plausible moderate account of beneficence endorses these two necessary 
conditions. It is controversial whether these conditions are met even in the standard 
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case of aid for spatially distant contemporaries.32 We can side-step that controversy. 
Our question is whether the two conditions are met in the Choice. In particular, will 
our future philosopher recognise either our innocence or our ownership? We can 
imagine her response. 
 
‘The two affluent conditions are not met in the Choice. First consider innocence. 
By continuing Business-as-usual, affluent people harmed those they had already 
harmed. Affluents were not collectively innocent! But were some individual 
affluents merely innocent bystanders? Affluent philosophers disagreed here. 
Some held that, with climate change, individual acts do no harm, because the 
marginal impact of any given act on any given future individual is negligible, 
imperceptible, or incalculable.33 Others argued that any individual who is party 
to a harmful collective action shares responsibility for that harm. In one much-
discussed example, a thousand bandits each steal one bean from each of a 
thousand villagers. 34 Losing a single bean is not a serious harm. But each bandit 
still shares some responsibility for the fact that all the villagers starve. 
 
‘For many affluent thinkers, collective responsibility can arise even when a 
collective lacks any formal organisation or structure. Members of the collective 
are then individually responsible for (a) their “share” in the collective action; (b) 
their willing membership in the collective; (c) their failure to actively distance 
themselves from the collective action, perhaps by publically denouncing it; (d) 
their failure to prevent the collective action, perhaps by campaigning against it; 
and (e) their failure to create some alternative collective agent to undo the harm. 
 
‘We have two reasons to take sides in this affluent debate. First, our own ethics, 
centred on the just survival lottery, emphasizes the importance of holding 
individuals responsible for their contributions to collective actions. Second, when 
we think of the affluents, only their collective impact matters. Individual affluent 
actions interest us only insofar as they causally contributed to the breaking of 
our world. We see people from the affluent age primarily as affluents – as 
members of the collective who did this to us. (This is not how affluents saw 
themselves. They did not self-identify as affluent world-breakers. But this is how 
history has remembered them.35) We do hold affluent individuals responsible for 
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collective harms, even if each individual’s contribution was not itself directly 
harmful. 
 
‘The second affluent condition is ownership. Many broken world societies reject 
individual property entirely, while those that acknowledge property rights do so 
only within a just survival lottery. Your rights are determined by the lottery. 
Current notions of ownership could never sanction Business-as-usual. But our 
question concerns affluent notions of property. Were affluents simply using what 
they reasonably believed that they owned? 
 
‘Unfortunately, affluent defences of individual property break down in the face 
of a broken future. I shall consider three: libertarianism, contractualism, and 
utilitarianism. For the theories themselves, and further critique, see the lectures 
collected in Ethics for a Broken World. 
 
‘Libertarians must satisfy either Locke’s proviso or Nozick’s proviso. Property 
must first be justly acquired, and initial acquisition is only legitimate when it 
either (a) leaves enough and as good for others; or (b) leaves others no worse-off 
than they would otherwise have been. If the affluents are to justify their 
acquisition to us, then “others” must include us. But the affluents did not leave 
enough and as good for us, and we are worse-off than we would have been if they 
had chosen a property regime that did not lead to dangerous anthropocentric 
climate change. Libertarianism cannot justify Business-as-usual. 
 
‘Libertarianism promises absolute rights, limited only by the rights of others. 
Other affluent theories deliver more circumscribed rights. Affluent 
contractualists argued that everyone will agree to a package of rights and 
prerogatives that guarantees each individual a private sphere, including an 
adequate package of individually-owned resources, where she is free to favour 
herself. Affluent rule utilitarians argued that the ideal moral code (the code 
whose near-universal internalisation would maximise human well-being into the 
future) also includes a private sphere, individual property, and self-regarding 
permissions.36 
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‘Whatever their original merits, these arguments do not translate to the Choice. 
If contractualist or utilitarian reasoning is to justify Business-as-usual to us, then 
“everyone” must include us. We must: (a) be parties to the contractualist 
bargain; (b) receive rights under that bargain; (c) be among those who 
internalise the rule utilitarian ideal code; and (d) have our interests counted 
when that code is measured against aggregate human well-being. But why would 
we agree to a bargain that permitted Business-as-usual? And how can any moral 
code maximise well-being if it leads to a broken world? (The two questions are 
linked. We reject the bargain precisely because it yields a code that serves us so 
ill.) We can thus reasonably reject affluent claims to individual ownership.’37 
 
I conclude that future people can reasonably reject both the innocence condition and 
the ownership condition, at least in the context of the Choice. As both conditions are 
necessary presuppositions of any moderate agent-centred prerogative to come into 
play, it follows that such prerogatives cannot justify Business-as-Usual. 
 
7. Emergency prerogatives, duties to contemporaries, and subsistence rights. 
 
Neither impersonal defences nor general agent-centred prerogatives will persuade 
future philosophers. Perhaps the best defence lies in-between. Present people’s 
sacrifice in Conservation is less significant than what they impose on future people. 
But it is still sufficient to justify Business-as-usual. 
 
Not all prerogatives are limited to beneficence. Even without innocence and 
ownership, agents can still legitimately steal to feed themselves or their children, kill 
in self-defence, or save themselves ahead of those they have harmed. In an 
‘emergency’, even moral prohibitions on theft, murder, and harm may be suspended. 
Is the Choice such a moral emergency? 
 
Any emergency-based individual justification for Business-as-usual can only have 
very limited scope. Most of our individual failures to respond to climate change are 
not emergencies, even by the most generous standards. (Having to cycle to work, 
become vegetarian, or accept a lower standard of living are not existential crises!) If 
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this is our only justification, we must still depart from our actual ‘business-as-usual’ 
much more than almost any of us do. 
 
Only the most destitute individuals can enjoy individual emergency prerogatives. 
Henry Shue distinguishes between luxury emissions and subsistence emissions, 
arguing that, despite our collective responsibility to reduce CO2 emissions, everyone 
has a right to essential subsistence emissions.38 Shue’s distinction suggests the 
following defence: Our poorest contemporaries are not obliged to abandon Business-
as-usual if that would threaten their subsistence. 
 
This justification might seem especially limited. Subsistence is not yet at issue for 
most of us, and our poorest contemporaries make comparatively little contribution to 
climate change. However, by invoking a human right to subsistence, we can then 
introduce a related justification that does apply to us. Perhaps we are obliged to 
continue with Business-as-usual out of respect for the human rights of our poorer 
contemporaries.39 
 
The Choice is stark. Conservation involves sacrificing favourable conditions now to 
benefit (worse-off) future people. Conservation would thus leave some present basic 
needs unmet. Some present people will die who would have lived under Business-as-
usual. Surely those individuals, at least, can reasonably reject any moral principle that 
prohibits Business-as-usual? Surely our future philosopher must recognise a right to 
subsistence? 
 
The idea that any individual can veto any moral principle that gratuitously leads to her 
death is compelling. However, we must tread carefully here. If such a veto exists, then 
surely future people enjoy it too. But they will then veto Business-as-usual. Ex 
hypothesi, Business-as-usual results in at least as many preventable deaths as 
Conservation. While efforts to avoid climate change threaten the rights of poor 
contemporaries, failure to avoid climate change violates the human rights of future 
people.40 
 
Human rights conflict in the Choice. We thus face an obvious dilemma. Either our 
account of rights recognises future people’s human right to subsistence, or it does not. 
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If not, they will reject any defence based upon that account. But if we do recognise 
their rights, how can we defend Business-as-usual? 
 
The problem is that our notion of human rights does not admit even the possibility of 
irreconcilable conflicts. Human rights must be guaranteed to all. Yet, in a broken 
future where not everyone can even survive, such conflicts are a regrettable fact of 
life. Perhaps our future philosophers can teach us how to rethink our affluent notion 
of rights. 
 
‘To justify themselves to us, the affluents must offer us intelligible 
interpretations of rights, luxury, and subsistence that fit our moral perspective. 
Can we reinterpret these affluent notions? The affluent distinction between 
luxury and subsistence emissions seems irrelevant in our broken world. For us, 
subsistence is a luxury! I think we can reinterpret this distinction. But that 
reinterpretation no longer justifies Business-as-usual. 
 
‘For the affluents, “luxury emissions” referred to unnecessarily wasteful 
emissions far beyond anything that was remotely environmentally sustainable. 
No one today defends those emissions. But many contemporary political theorists 
do defend emissions beyond subsistence. Of course, we can't all enjoy such 
emissions, because we can't all survive. That's why we have a survival lottery in 
the first place! But lotteries that only promise bare subsistence are very under-
motivating. Many people prefer lotteries that offer a lower chance of survival, 
but where those who do survive enjoy a higher standard of living. Individual 
preferences differ markedly here, and therefore some societies have 
experimented with flexible lotteries where participants can choose between high-
risk-high-lifestyle tickets and low-risk-subsistence ones. (Consider the well-
established lottery that underpins the feudal society of New Scotland.)41 
 
‘Incidentally, this is one reason why it is so difficult to locate the threshold when 
bearable conditions are lost. A stable lottery must hold out a credible promise 
that a reasonable number of people will enjoy something markedly better than 
mere survival. 
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‘If a “right to subsistence” means that everyone can insist on their own 
guaranteed subsistence emissions, then there can be no such right in a broken 
world. Many affluent philosophers thought that, without this “most basic” of all 
rights, the very idea of rights must collapse. (What use are rights if you cannot 
even survive?) And our contemporary extreme utilitarians agree that rights have 
no place in the broken world. 
 
‘But other broken world philosophers reinterpret rights in light of the just 
survival lottery. The historical emergence of lotteries as an alternative to brute 
force reflected the belief that each of us has the right to a fair chance to survive. 
And the elaborate lottery redesign processes that operate in all broken world 
societies (to the despair of undemocratic bureaucrats) are grounded in an 
individual right to participate in collective decision-making – a right to help 
design and implement the institutions that will govern one's life (and may end it). 
Given the stark choices we face, many broken world dwellers are even more 
focused on their rights than our rights-obsessed affluent ancestors. 
 
‘Affluents would regard any survival lottery as a monstrous violation of rights. 
But in the chaotic climate of our broken world, lotteries protect and define our 
rights. We fine-tune our views on the balance between freedom and survival by 
participating in the lottery and in the preceding deliberation. (Would you rather 
have a high probability of bare survival or a longer shot at a more affluent life?) 
For us, this is what a right is: an equal input to collective deliberation, and then a 
fair chance to live or die. 
 
‘So we can reinterpret the affluent right to subsistence. But now that right 
cannot justify affluent Business-as-usual. We cannot enjoy a universal right to 
subsistence – either positive or negative. We don't expect others to guarantee our 
survival, and we know that we cannot reasonably claim a negative right to try to 
survive on our own. The resources of the Earth are too fragile and limited to 
permit such futile libertarian fantasies. We would not even allow the 
comparatively poor affluent people to insist on their own subsistence. (Why 
should we grant any affluent individual a right that, as a result of their collective 
choices, we cannot claim for ourselves?) 
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‘There is a temporal paradox here. In the early-affluent period, when universal 
subsistence in perpetuity was an option, comparatively poor individuals could 
claim a right to subsistence, and their comparatively wealthy contemporaries 
could reasonably consider themselves bound to respect that right. But later 
affluents, knowing that a broken world loomed, could not make these claims.’ 
 
To persuade future people, any justification of Business-as-Usual based on our rights 
must appeal to some general account of rights that they also enjoy. Because survival 
cannot be guaranteed in a broken world, future people cannot themselves enjoy a right 
to subsistence. Therefore, they will reasonably deny that all present people enjoy a 
right to guaranteed subsistence. Some future people will reject rights altogether, while 
those who retain rights will reinterpret them in ways that undermine any rights-based 
defence of Business-as-Usual. 
 
8. What rights do we have? 
 
Our future philosopher reconceptualises rights in light of some future survival lottery: 
a social institution that spreads risk fairly while maintaining incentives to social 
cooperation. A just lottery will maximise our collective chances of survival, and then 
fairly distribute individual chances to survive. 
 
If there are rights that all individuals (both present and future) can enjoy, they must be 
lottery-based rights. But now present individuals can reject Conservation if it prevents 
their survival without also instituting something like a just lottery. We cannot simply 
abandon Business-as-usual and let the chips fall where they may. But nor can we 
justly continue with Business-as-usual. Instead, we must collectively bear the burden 
of the sacrifices we owe to future people. 
 
This may seem too much to ask. Surely we are not obliged to actually decide who 
lives and who dies? We close by imagining our future philosopher’s final reply. 
 
‘When they realised that, while they could guarantee their own basic needs, their 
own descendants would need to run a survival lottery, the late-affluents should 
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have adopted our moral perspective, and begun to explicitly operate a survival 
lottery across the generations. Once favourable conditions could no longer be 
guaranteed in perpetuity, they ceased to be a reasonable basis for determining 
human rights. 
 
‘Of course, in one very real sense, the affluents did operate an intergenerational 
lottery – only they gave themselves winning tickets by insisting on guaranteed 
survival for as long as possible. No credible affluent moral theory could justify 
that! A just lottery across the generations must include everyone in every 
generation. No-one can enjoy a guaranteed right to subsistence – not even the 
wealthiest affluent person. The failure to implement such a lottery was a 
collective failing, for which each affluent individual is partly responsible.’ 
 
Of course, this is only one possible reply from one imaginary inhabitant of one 
possible future. Our failure to justify ourselves to her lacks the full force of a failure 
to persuade any actual person. However, the fact that reasonable people in credible 
futures might judge us this harshly does give us a second-personal reason to choose 
Conservation instead of Business-as-usual; and that gives our obligations to future 
people a kind of felt urgency that is lacking if we limit ourselves to purely impersonal 
reasons.42 
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